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In a prisoner's dilemma, the Nash Equilibrium might not have a dominant strategy for either player. ​

A) True
B) False

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In a particular town, Comvision and Veriview are the only two providers of cable TV service. Comvision and Veriview constitute a


A) duopoly, whether they collude or not.
B) cartel, whether they collude or not.
C) Nash industry, whether they collude or not.
D) monopolistically competitive market if they charge the same price.

E) None of the above
F) All of the above

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Table 17-15 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B) . Table 17-15 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B) .   -Refer to Table 17-15. If player B chooses Right, player A should choose A) Up and earn a payoff of 1. B) Middle and earn a payoff of 5. C) Middle and earn a payoff of 7. D) Down and earn a payoff of 4. -Refer to Table 17-15. If player B chooses Right, player A should choose


A) Up and earn a payoff of 1.
B) Middle and earn a payoff of 5.
C) Middle and earn a payoff of 7.
D) Down and earn a payoff of 4.

E) A) and D)
F) A) and B)

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Scenario 17-6 Assume that a local telecommunications company sells high speed internet access and cable television. The company's only two customers are Taylor and Tim. Taylor is willing to pay $50 per month for high speed internet access and $50 per month for cable television. Tim is willing to pay only $20 per month for high speed internet access, but is willing to pay $70 per month for cable television. Assume that the telecommunications company can provide each of these products at zero marginal cost. -Refer to Scenario 17-6. If the telecommunications provider is able to use tying to price high speed internet access and cable television, what is the profit-maximizing price to charge for the "tied" good?

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How does the prisoners' dilemma game apply to real-life situations?

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It illustrates how cooperation...

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Figure 17-3. Hector and Bart are roommates. On a particular day, their apartment needs to be cleaned. Each person has to decide whether to take part in cleaning. At the end of the day, either the apartment will be completely clean (if one or both roommates take part in cleaning) , or it will remain dirty (if neither roommate cleans) . With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy) , the possible outcomes are as follows: Figure 17-3. Hector and Bart are roommates. On a particular day, their apartment needs to be cleaned. Each person has to decide whether to take part in cleaning. At the end of the day, either the apartment will be completely clean (if one or both roommates take part in cleaning) , or it will remain dirty (if neither roommate cleans) . With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy)  to 10 (very happy) , the possible outcomes are as follows:   -Refer to Figure 17-3. If this game is played only once, then the most likely outcome is that A) Hector and Bart both clean. B) Hector cleans and Bart does not clean. C) Bart cleans and Hector does not clean. D) neither Hector nor Bart cleans. -Refer to Figure 17-3. If this game is played only once, then the most likely outcome is that


A) Hector and Bart both clean.
B) Hector cleans and Bart does not clean.
C) Bart cleans and Hector does not clean.
D) neither Hector nor Bart cleans.

E) None of the above
F) All of the above

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Table 17-2 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Table 17-2 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below:   -Refer to Table 17-2. If this market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, what would be the price for water? A) $0 B) $4 C) $6 D) $12 -Refer to Table 17-2. If this market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, what would be the price for water?


A) $0
B) $4
C) $6
D) $12

E) A) and C)
F) B) and C)

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Table 17-19 Consider a small town that has two grocery stores from which residents can choose to buy a loaf of bread. The store owners each must make a decision to set a high bread price or a low bread price. The payoff table, showing profit per week, is provided below. The profit in each cell is shown as (Store 1, Store 2) . Table 17-19 Consider a small town that has two grocery stores from which residents can choose to buy a loaf of bread. The store owners each must make a decision to set a high bread price or a low bread price. The payoff table, showing profit per week, is provided below. The profit in each cell is shown as (Store 1, Store 2) .   -Refer to Table 17-19. If grocery store 1 sets a high price, what price should grocery store 2 set? And what will grocery store 2's payoff equal? A) Low price, $400 B) High price, $50 C) Low price, $250 D) High price, $325 -Refer to Table 17-19. If grocery store 1 sets a high price, what price should grocery store 2 set? And what will grocery store 2's payoff equal?


A) Low price, $400
B) High price, $50
C) Low price, $250
D) High price, $325

E) C) and D)
F) B) and D)

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Briefly describe the practice of resale price maintenance.

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Resale price maintenance is a ...

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Table 17-21 The Chicken Game is named for a contest in which drivers test their courage by driving straight at each other. John and Paul have a common interest to avoid crashing into each other, but they also have a personal, competing interest to not turn first to demonstrate their courage to those observing the contest. The payoff table for this situation is provided below. The payoffs are shown as (John, Paul) . Table 17-21 The Chicken Game is named for a contest in which drivers test their courage by driving straight at each other. John and Paul have a common interest to avoid crashing into each other, but they also have a personal, competing interest to not turn first to demonstrate their courage to those observing the contest. The payoff table for this situation is provided below. The payoffs are shown as (John, Paul) .   -Refer to Table 17-21. If John chooses Turn, what will Paul choose to do and what will Paul's payoff equal? A) Turn, 10 B) Drive Straight, 20 C) Turn, 5 D) Drive Straight, 0 -Refer to Table 17-21. If John chooses Turn, what will Paul choose to do and what will Paul's payoff equal?


A) Turn, 10
B) Drive Straight, 20
C) Turn, 5
D) Drive Straight, 0

E) A) and B)
F) B) and D)

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Some business practices that appear to reduce competition, such as resale price maintenance, may have legitimate economic purposes.

A) True
B) False

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Table 17-4 The table shows the town of Mauston's demand schedule for gasoline. For simplicity, assume the town's gasoline seller(s) incur no costs in selling gasoline. Table 17-4 The table shows the town of Mauston's demand schedule for gasoline. For simplicity, assume the town's gasoline seller(s)  incur no costs in selling gasoline.   -Refer to Table 17-4. If there are exactly two sellers of gasoline in Mauston and if they collude, then which of the following outcomes is most likely? A) Each seller will sell 250 gallons and charge a price of $5. B) Each seller will sell 175 gallons and charge a price of $3. C) Each seller will sell 125 gallons and charge a price of $2.5. D) Each seller will sell 125 gallons and charge a price of $5. -Refer to Table 17-4. If there are exactly two sellers of gasoline in Mauston and if they collude, then which of the following outcomes is most likely?


A) Each seller will sell 250 gallons and charge a price of $5.
B) Each seller will sell 175 gallons and charge a price of $3.
C) Each seller will sell 125 gallons and charge a price of $2.5.
D) Each seller will sell 125 gallons and charge a price of $5.

E) B) and D)
F) A) and D)

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Table 17-28 Suppose that two firms determine that each could lower its costs and increase its profits if both reduced their advertising budgets. But in order for the plan to work, each firm must agree to refrain from advertising. Each firm believes that advertising works by increasing the demand for the firm's product, but each firm also believes that if neither firm advertises, the cost savings will outweigh the lost sales. The table below lists each firm's individual profits: Firm A Breaks agreement Maintains agreement and advertises and does not advertise Table 17-28 Suppose that two firms determine that each could lower its costs and increase its profits if both reduced their advertising budgets. But in order for the plan to work, each firm must agree to refrain from advertising. Each firm believes that advertising works by increasing the demand for the firm's product, but each firm also believes that if neither firm advertises, the cost savings will outweigh the lost sales. The table below lists each firm's individual profits: Firm A Breaks agreement Maintains agreement and advertises and does not advertise   -Refer to Table 17-28. What is the outcome of this game? A) Firm A will advertise but Firm B will not. B) Firm A will not advertise but Firm B will. C) Neither Firm A nor Firm B will advertise. D) Both Firm A and Firm B will advertise. -Refer to Table 17-28. What is the outcome of this game?


A) Firm A will advertise but Firm B will not.
B) Firm A will not advertise but Firm B will.
C) Neither Firm A nor Firm B will advertise.
D) Both Firm A and Firm B will advertise.

E) A) and D)
F) None of the above

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The players in a two-person game are choosing between Strategy X and Strategy Y. If the second player chooses Strategy X, the first player's best outcome is to select X. If the second player chooses Strategy Y, the first player's best outcome is to select X. For the first player, Strategy X is called a


A) dominant strategy.
B) collusive strategy.
C) repeated-trial strategy.
D) cartel strategy.

E) A) and C)
F) B) and C)

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Table 17-32 Suppose that Angelina and Brad own the only two professional photography stores in town. Each must choose between a low price and a high price for senior photo packages. The annual economic profit from each strategy is indicated in the table below: Angelina Low price High price Table 17-32 Suppose that Angelina and Brad own the only two professional photography stores in town. Each must choose between a low price and a high price for senior photo packages. The annual economic profit from each strategy is indicated in the table below: Angelina Low price High price   -Refer to Table 17-32. Is there a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe it. -Refer to Table 17-32. Is there a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe it.

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Yes. Angelina has a dominant strategy to...

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Hot dog vendors on the beach fail to cooperate with one another on the quantity of hot dogs they should sell to earn monopoly profits. A consequence of their failure is that, relative to the outcome the vendors would like, (i) The quantity of hot dogs supplied is closer to the socially optimal level. (ii) The price of hot dogs is closer to marginal cost. (iii) The hot dog market at the beach is less competitive.


A) (i) and (ii)
B) (ii) and (iii)
C) (i) and (iii)
D) (iii) only

E) A) and B)
F) B) and D)

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Table 17-19 Consider a small town that has two grocery stores from which residents can choose to buy a loaf of bread. The store owners each must make a decision to set a high bread price or a low bread price. The payoff table, showing profit per week, is provided below. The profit in each cell is shown as (Store 1, Store 2) . Table 17-19 Consider a small town that has two grocery stores from which residents can choose to buy a loaf of bread. The store owners each must make a decision to set a high bread price or a low bread price. The payoff table, showing profit per week, is provided below. The profit in each cell is shown as (Store 1, Store 2) .   -Refer to Table 17-19. What is the Nash Equilibrium of this price-setting game? A) Grocery store 1: Low price Grocery store 2: Low price B) Grocery store 1: Low price Grocery store 2: High price C) Grocery store 1: High price Grocery store 2: How price D) Grocery store 1: High price Grocery store 2: High price -Refer to Table 17-19. What is the Nash Equilibrium of this price-setting game?


A) Grocery store 1: Low price Grocery store 2: Low price
B) Grocery store 1: Low price Grocery store 2: High price
C) Grocery store 1: High price Grocery store 2: How price
D) Grocery store 1: High price Grocery store 2: High price

E) None of the above
F) A) and D)

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Table 17-18 This table shows a game played between two firms, Firm A and Firm B. In this game each firm must decide how much output (Q) to produce: 10 units or 12 units. The profit for each firm is given in the table as (Profit for Firm A, Profit for Firm B) . Table 17-18 This table shows a game played between two firms, Firm A and Firm B. In this game each firm must decide how much output (Q)  to produce: 10 units or 12 units. The profit for each firm is given in the table as (Profit for Firm A, Profit for Firm B) .   -Refer to Table 17-18. The dominant strategy For Firm A is to produce A) 10 units and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to produce 10 units. B) 10 units and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to produce 12 units. C) 12 units and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to produce 10 units. D) 12 units and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to produce 12 units. -Refer to Table 17-18. The dominant strategy For Firm A is to produce


A) 10 units and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to produce 10 units.
B) 10 units and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to produce 12 units.
C) 12 units and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to produce 10 units.
D) 12 units and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to produce 12 units.

E) A) and D)
F) A) and C)

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Much of the research on game theory in recent decades was driven by attempts to analyze actions of players during


A) the Great Depression of the 1930s.
B) World War II.
C) the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.
D) the ascendancy of the conservative movement in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s.

E) A) and C)
F) All of the above

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Which of the following statements about oligopolies is not correct?


A) An oligopolistic market has only a few sellers.
B) The actions of any one seller can have a large impact on the profits of all other sellers.
C) Oligopolistic firms are interdependent in a way that competitive firms are not.
D) Unlike monopolies and monopolistically competitive markets, oligopolies prices do not exceed their marginal revenues.

E) None of the above
F) A) and B)

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